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The Ottoman Empire’s conquest
of the Balkans and subsequent
administration left a perplexing religious
legacy. The Islamic Ottoman presence
lasted almost five centuries, yet
Christianity remained the overwhelming
religion of choice in the area. The
Ottoman treatment of subject Christians
has been long debated, with
characterizations ranging from a
cosmopolitan haven of freedom to a
brutal rule of forced conversion.
However, the real picture appears far
more complex than these generalizations
– the Ottoman relationship with
Orthodox Christianity in the Balkans
changed over time, depending in part on
religious tenets but also largely on the
realities and varying situations facing the
Ottoman state over time. A glance at the
Orthodox Christian church under the
Ottoman Empire from the early fifteenth
to mid sixteenth century gives a
revealing glimpse at some of the
changing relationships of conquered
Christians to the state.
Accounts of historians from
various perspectives have viewed the
Orthodox/Ottoman relationship in vastly
different lights. Englishman James
Ludlow’s report on the Janissary system
in the late fifteenth century gives an
impression of Islamic religious
domination. Ludlow emphasizes the

harshness of Janissary training and the
strict discipline enforced upon new
recruits, and gives numerous examples
as to the slave-like status these men are
reduced.1 Ogier Busbecq offers a
different contemporary understanding
from the mid 16th century. The Holy
Roman Empire’s ambassador writes in
glowing terms of the discipline and
courtesy of the Janissaries. He also
remarks that Janissary detachments are
scattered throughout the Empire not only
to guard against external threats but also
to protect Christians and Jews from the
“violence of the mob”.2 The contrast
between Ogier’s and Ludlow’s reactions
speaks to dual Western European
reactions to the empire during the time
period studied, alternating between fear
and respect for its successes. As Europe
advanced and the Ottoman military and
technological advantage became a thing
of the past, this strong reaction to the
Empire and its subject Christians would
fade to relative silence.3
Modern historians have offered a
more detailed look at the Church / State
relationship. Greek historian G.
Georgiades Arnakis focused on the
Church in Constantinople for an article
published in 1953. Arnakis portrays the
rights of the Church as legally
established and binding, but far from
inviolable in practice.4 He paints a
1

"The Tribute of Children, 1493," July 1998
[cited 2004]. Available from
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/islam/1493janiss
aries.html., 1.
2
"The Turkish Letters, 1555-1562," July 1998
[cited 2004]. Available from
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1555busbe
cq.html., 1.
3
Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History,
(New York: Modern Library, 2000), xxxiii to
xxxv.
4
G. Georgiades Arnakis, "The Greek Church of
Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire," The
Journal of Modern History 24, no. 3 (1952): 239.

picture of persecution, citing
conversions of churches to mosques,
martyrdom of patriarchs in the mid
seventeenth century, and characterizes
Ottoman authorities as valuing
Christians as little more than a tax base
to be exploited.5 Arnakis presents the
relationship as a power struggle, by a
church “waging a struggle for
Christianity” against the “islamicization
and turkification” presumably desired by
the Ottoman government.6 Overall,
Arnakis views the continued existence of
Christianity in Ottoman lands as
evidence of the triumph of the Orthodox
Church in an unequal religious struggle.
Steven Runciman takes a more
comprehensive look at the Church under
Ottoman rule in his book, published in
1968. Runciman characterizes the
“millet” system of semi-autonomous self
government used by the Ottomans as
along traditional Islamic lines, and states
the practice was so well known that it
was unlikely to have ever been officially
written down.7 He does find codified
legal restrictions on Christians, and
characterizes them as second-class
citizens.8 He also discusses the
Church’s ongoing difficulties in
maintaining urban churches and
establishing schools thanks to Ottoman
interference, but he concludes this is as
much an inherent result of the Ottoman
conception of the place of subjugated
peoples rather than any systematic
persecution9. Runciman finds the
problems of the Church to be in large

part to difficulties in reorienting a
previously decentralized religious
organization into an administrative
successor to the Byzantine state10. The
Ottoman state exerts substantial pressure
indirectly (and occasionally directly),
but Runciman finds Christian difficulties
stemming from the second-class stature
typical to subjugated minorities in
Islamic states.
Recent examinations of the
Balkans have used very different
approaches to discover a new
perspective. Braude and Lewis’s
collection from a 1978 research seminar
builds on Runciman’s legacy in
examining the status of Christians at
particular points in time through various
articles. They elaborate that Christian
minority status under Islam was a
compact between the rulers and ruled –
it could be used to keep Christians in
their proper place, but also to prevent
government abuses. The authors
characterize the treatment of Christians
by the authorities as variable depending
on the circumstances.11 Overall, the
editors summarize the contributions and
conclusions on the status of Christians as
one governed more often by practical
considerations than strict Islamic law.
Dennis Hupchick also offers a different
perspective on the Church-State
relationship in his 1993 article focusing
on Bulgarian ethnic awareness.
Hupchick describes the church as a
“veritable department” in the Ottoman

5

Arnakis, 238, 243-248.
Arnakis, 245.
7
Steven Runciman, The Great Church in
Captivity: a Study of the Patriarchate of
Constantinople from the eve of the Turkish
Conquest to the Greek War of Independence
(London: Cambridge U.P., 1968), 167, 170.
8
Runciman, 79.
9
Runciman, 192, 218.
6

10

Runciman, 206-207.
Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis eds.,
Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The
Functioning of a Plural Society, (New York:
Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982), 9.
Braude remarks that enforcement of restrictions
depended most on whether the state felt
threatened.
11

government.12 He also finds active
efforts by the Ottomans to assimilate
Bulgarian lands through resettlement of
Turks coupled with displacement of
Bulgarians from towns, though he
admits the practice was spotty and
inconsistent.13 Hupchick agrees with
earlier historians in that Ottoman policy
changed over time, but his contribution
to the general debate is his focus on the
church as a means of enhancing cultural
and ethnic identity. He concludes that
the Church promoted Greek Orthodoxy
over the interests of its various
constituencies, and that the “millet”
system drowned out competing cultures
under Greek ideals.
Perhaps the most profitable
starting point in deciphering the status of
Christians in the Ottoman Empire is the
legal and religious traditions regarding
religious minorities the Ottomans
inherited from early Islamic law and
practice. Early Islamic law took care to
impart a special status to people of
monotheistic, confessional faiths such as
Christianity. The Koran’s statement that
“there is no constraint in religion” was
generally interpreted as an
encouragement of tolerance towards
specific religions, primarily Christians
and Jews.14 A later passage encouraged
Muslims to fight against those
unbelievers, but made a specific
exception for those who had been given
“the Book”, who would only be made to
pay a tax in recognition of their
“humiliated position”.15 C.E. Bosworth
describes this as a vision of a contract
between conquered unbelievers and

Muslims, a confirmation of their subject
status.16 This sort of pointed legal
framework is not surprising, given the
circumstances in which Mohammed
created Islam. Near Eastern minds had
always respected the founders of the
other great monotheistic faiths.17 Even
Arabia still contained minority
communities at the time of
Mohammed’s death, and it offered
precedents such as treaties made with the
Christian community of Najrān (who
promised aid to the Prophet).18 As the
religious and legal backbone of Islamic
behavior, the Koran’s tolerance for
specific religious minorities was a major
factor in the attitude of Muslims to these
conquered peoples.
The reality of dramatic Islamic
military successes also served to
promote a policy of conciliation to
conquered peoples. The origin of Islamic
tolerance for the practice of other
religions seems to stem from the very
earliest period of Muslim conquest, as
the numerically inferior Muslim Arabs
found themselves needing security
precautions over their new subjects.19
The contemporary Muslim Balādhurī
shows a striking example of the reality
of conquest in the accounts of invasions
reaching into India. Infidel religions not
exempted from combat unto death (such
as Buddhism and especially Hinduism)
were theoretically supposed to be either
converted or killed, but this was not the
case in India. The account reports that,
while some massacres did occur, for the
most part conquered Indians were
accorded the same dhimma minority
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Dennis P. Hupchick, "Orthodoxy and
Bulgarian Ethnic Awareness Under Ottoman
Rule, 1396-1762," Nationalities Papers 21, no. 2
(1993): 75.
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Hupchick, 77.
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Braude, 4-5.
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Braude, 5.

C.E. Bosworth, “The Concept of Dhimma in
Early Islam,” in Braude and Lewis, Christians
and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The
Functioning of a Plural Society, 41.
17
Bosworth, 37.
18
Bosworth, 42.
19
Braude, 5.

status, as were Christians and Jews,
acknowledging the superiority of Islam
and performing other duties for Muslims
in exchange for religious freedom.
Bosworth adds that over the years the
practice of extending dhimma status to
even polytheistic Hindus became
normal.20 The dramatically successful
and speedy Muslim conquests promoted
policies of religious freedom to
minorities for practical reasons as well
as religious. The Ottoman experience
would incorporate both religious and
practical aspects of this tradition.
The Ottoman dynasty was
formed at the turn of the fourteenth
century, and differed in some notable
respects from earlier Islamic states.
Emerging Ottoman society brought with
it a somewhat different worldview from
established Islamic civilization: the
Ottoman dynasty was born from hardfighting frontier warlords, and this
frontier identity remained an important
part of Ottoman consciousness.21
Anatolia remained an insecure
battleground, and as late as the fifteenth
century the dynasty flirted with collapse.
The insecure birth of the Ottoman
dynasty, along with its vibrant youth as
an expanding state, combined to give it a
different perspective on Christian
20

Bosworth, 43. This practice was in conformity
to the attitudes of contemporary religions:
Bosworth, 37, adds that that few Near Eastern
empires had sought or achieved religious
exclusiveness. Runciman, 77, finds evidence
that the Sassanid and Persian empires gave
religious minorities considerable autonomy and
that it was traditional to group minorities by
religion.
21
İ. Metin Kunt, “Transformation of Zimmi into
Askerî”, in Braude and Lewis, Christians and
Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of
a Plural Society, 56. Kunt, 59, relays a
characterization on the Empire by the renowned
Halil Inalcik as a dynastic empire with the lone
goal of furthering its dominion.

minorities than traditional Islamic states.
Kunt points out the basic dividing line in
the emerging Ottoman state as a
functional distinction between those who
pay taxes and those who did not - in
other words, a distinction between
civilian and military/official.22 He cites
the fifteenth century Ottoman chronicler
Asikpasazâde who relates that as certain
Christian towns were captured, Christian
soldiers thought trustworthy received
grants of well-appointed fiefs or were
placed (along with Muslims) in
fortresses.23 Inalcik attributes the
adoption of Christian elites and military
men into Ottoman service as part of the
expansionist doctrine of the dynasty, and
adds that a conciliatory policy towards
Christians made conquest of Christian
lands all the easier.24 The expansionist
character of the Ottoman state allowed
the pragmatism evident in Islamic policy
towards conquered Christians to
predominate over strict Islamic law.
Conquest and expansion were not
the only considerations, however, and
the Ottoman attitudes towards Christians
also reflected a desire to expand dynastic
power and prestige through the Janissary
corps and the devshirme system. This
novel Ottoman system involved taking
captured prisoners and village recruits of
young boys and molding them into
Ottoman elite soldiers and
administrators. Mansel cites Ottoman
court sources as identifying the main
motivation for the devshirme as one of
distrust of rival Turks and a desire to
centralize dynastic power through using
officials with no political connections.25
22

Kunt, 58.
Kunt, 59.
24
Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire; the
Classical age, 1300-1600 (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1973), 13.
25
Philip Mansel, Constantinople: City of the
World's Desire, 1453-1924, First U.S. Edition.
23

This explanation seems more plausible
than any religious motive, especially as
the Ottomans did not crack down on
Anatolian Christian minorities when
given an excellent opportunity.26
Moreover, the inescapable reality was
that devshirme recruitment violated
traditional Christian rights, an indication
that the Ottomans viewed Islamic
principles as secondary considerations.27
The creation of this uniquely Ottoman
system further illustrates that the early
Ottoman dynasty was fully able to break
from Islamic traditions when it suited
dynastic interests.
The Ottoman conquest of
Constantinople in 1453 consummated
the fate of Balkan Christians already
under Ottoman domination since the mid
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.
The larger coherent Christian society
present in the Balkans and the quick
pace of conquest relative to Anatolia
combined to leave the Orthodox Church
well entrenched, and Islam a distinct
minority.28 After the capture of

(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 18.
Mansel adds only five out of 48 grand viziers
since 1453 were ethnically Turkish.
26
Runciman. 32. Runciman mentions that while
the Ottomans allowed absentee bishops to return
to their sees, most chose not to despite pleas
from the Patriarch. This suggests a certain lack
of government concern early in the dynasty for
promoting the Islamic faith.
27
Kunt, 60-61. The official justification for
devshirme only arrived around 1500.
28
Speris Vryonis, Jr., “Religious Change and
Continuity in the Balkans and Anatolia”, in
Speris Vryonis Jr., Islam and Cultural Change in
the Middle Ages: [4. Giorgio Levi Della Vida
Biennial Conference, May 11-13, 1973, Near
Eastern Center, Univ. of Calif., Los
Angeles](Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1975). Vryonis, 129, 133, 137-8, points
out that the Balkans possessed self conscious
Christian cultural entities, and that they had not
suffered the long period of warfare in Anatolia

Constantinople and the securance of
Balkan areas, the Ottomans faced a
novel challenge in ruling an entire region
with a majority Christian persuasion.
Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II
attempted to solve this problem through
lines similar to existing Islamic practice.
Mehmed extended the so-called millet
system of internal autonomy to include
the Orthodox Patriarch as head of selfgovernment for all Christians,
responsible for taxation, justice, and
other matters.29 This decision was not
necessarily a foregone choice – the
sultan initially turned to Grand Duke
Loukas Notaras for political leadership,
and could have simply left the
Patriarchate seat vacant.30 The official
establishment of the Eucemenical
Patriarchate as head of minority
Christians was quite a shrewd choice – it
gave the central government one
accessible figure to deal with, and served
to pre-empt possible Roman Catholic
influence in the Balkans.31 Mehmed’s
raising of the Patriarchate was
symbolically powerful, but
fundamentally built upon established
Islamic tradition.

which corresponded to its far higher rate of
conversion to Islam.
29
Runciman, 167.
30
Braude, 77. – Grand Duke Notaras was the
leading Byzantine civil official in the city. He
was executed for disloyalty a few days after its
fall. Mansell, 9, Points out the Sultan could have
left the see vacant, and that his choice was a
diehard opponent of the proclaimed Roman
Catholic union.
31
Arnakis, 236-7, mentions the convenience of
nominating the respected but anti-union monk
Gennadios, and points out the ceremonial
implication of Ottoman Empire as Byzantine
successor state. Union between Rome and
Constantinople had technically been proclaimed
in the Council of Florence, but few clergy
accepted it.

The empowerment of the
Patriarchate of Constantinople in
particular was in large measure a change
from Byzantine realities. The
Patriarchate prior to 1453 had always
been first among equals with other
egalitarian bishoprics, and had never
approached the status of the Pope as a
power broker and arbiter.32 The Church
was forced to invent secular institutions
for services previously performed by the
civil government, resulting in a severe
strain on its limited resources.33 Despite
these problems, the Orthodox Church
inherited increased prestige from its
official role in self-government.34 The
fairly cosmopolitan outlook of Sultan
Mehmed II - who went so far in his love
of Greek Alexander the Great to
commission a biography of himself in
the same format and on the same style
paper as his copy of Arian’s life of
Alexander- helped enable the church to
adapt.35 Mehmed’s concern for creating
a cosmopolitan capital was a genuine
offense to some Turks.36 His readiness to
forcibly deport peoples of all flavors to
populate it when economic inducements
failed – Greek Christians, Jews,
Armenians, and Anatolian Turks –
32

Runciman, 9.
Runciman, 206-7. Runciman sees this
requirement as a large factor in the inability of
the Church to provide tolerable levels of
education to much of its priesthood. Education
and a Judicial system are two examples of
services now required.
34
Mansel, 10, identifies a diminishing
conversion rate to Islam among subject
Christians after this change.
35
Mansel, 6. Inalcik, 89, points out Mehmed
officially termed himself sovereign of the
Byzantines (Romans) and Muslims. Arnakis,
247, notes that he supervised gifts of cash to the
church until 1467.
36
Mansel, 24, reports that for anonymous
historians writing in simple Turkish,
Constantinople was a city of “torments and
distresses”.
33

showed his concern for both the
economic vitality of his cities and
pluralism within them.37 The new
responsibilities for the church were thus
assumed under a ruler at least partially
friendly, a fact which enabled them to be
assumed more smoothly.
The resulting arrangement and its
legal features are a matter of some
controversy. Braude’s analysis of the
term millet commonly used to describe it
shows that the word, meaning religious
community, was never applied to
Christian communities in this timeframe
but was used solely to describe either
Islam itself, or the communities of
prestigious foreign Christians the
Ottomans wished to woo. The
arrangement was also probably informal
and not legally binding.38 The resulting
agreement did, however, feature an
37

Robert Mantran, “Foreign Merchants and the
Minorities in Istanbul during the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries”, in Braude and Lewis,
Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The
Functioning of a Plural Society, 128. Runciman,
168, calls co-operation of the Greeks “essential”
to the Imperial economy, as the Turks were not
adept at commerce, seamanship, and preferred an
urban to an agricultural lifestyle. Heath W.
Lowry, Studies in Defterology: Ottoman Society
in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries
(Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1992), 57, agrees that
the policy of forced deportation reflected not
only an awareness on Mehmed on the
importance of trade and commerce, but the care
with which he introduced missing religious
groups suggests an interest in developing
cosmopolitan centers.
38
Braude, 70, 74, summarizes that the lack of an
explicit term for internal Christians in such an
organized beauracracy as the Ottoman suggests
the absence of an instutionalized policy towards
Christian. Runciman, 170, adds that its unlikely
any new constitution-type document was ever
written down, as the general provisions of such
arrangements for religious minorities were well
known enough already. Braude, 79, adds a
search of church archives in 1519 found no legal
document spelling out its rights.

understood relationship: Christians
would be taxed more heavily than
Muslims, were faced with restrictions on
gaining property, saw lawsuits involving
Muslims tried in Muslim courts, and had
the danger of the devshirme involved as
well.39 Legal contests involving
Christians and Muslims were further
tilted in the latter’s direction as
Christians could not legally give
testimony, as their failure to recognize
the true light of Islam was felt to be
proof of defective morality.40 These
precepts, while probably not officially
written down, were understood and
applicable to the subject Christian
population.
The pressures of rapid Ottoman
expansion in this period also resulted in
a surprising tolerance of Christians in
quasi-official state positions. Christian
military men who the Ottomans felt
could be loyal were particular
beneficiaries during this period of
overstretched Ottoman resources41.
Lowry’s analysis of tax receipts for
newly conquered Greek areas in 1461
shows that timars (Ottoman fiefs) were
granted to not only Muslims who had
assisted in the conquest but also to local
Christian lords42. Lowry suspects these
39

Runciman, 79. Runciman, 189, relates that the
experience of 1520 when Selim I was dissuaded
from converting all Constantinople’s churches
when reminded of their quasi legal rights showed
these precepts could protect Christians also.
40
Bosworth, 49.
41
Kunt, 55. Kunt shows the practice of
incorporating Christian soldiers persisted as late
as the mid 1500s.
42
Lowry, 140-1. Lowry actually examines the
region in an around Trebizond, located in
northern Anatolia. However, Trebizond was a
recent conquest (1461), and remained a strong
center of Orthodox religion and Byzantine
culture during the preceding Turkish conquest of
Anatolia. Its conditions thus approximate the
Balkan experience fairly well.

Christian allies were incorporated to
help subdue the region until normal
Ottoman administrative practices could
be put in place.43 Kunt points out that
while these Christian soldiers often
converted, it was an individual choice,
and that some preferred to assert their
leading place by changing their names
but retaining their Christian religion.44
The reality that at least some Christian
soldiers were incorporated into the
Ottoman military structure following
conquest speaks volumes as to the
relative autonomy and favorable
conditions for Christianity under this
period. Mihailovic, a former Christian
serving with the Sultan’s army in the
mid 1460s, supports this supposition
through his praise of Ottoman justice in
general and in practice.45 The realities of
such rapid expansion as the empire
experienced under Mehmed II led to a
fairly liberal policy towards at least

43

Lowry, 143.
Kunt, 59-60. Kunt cites the example of two
timar holding brothers converting while a third
remained Christian, and an example of a man
changing his name and being referred to as
“Kafin Timuntas”, or Timuntas the infidel,
signifying his retention of his native religion.
45
Konstanty MichaŽowicz, Memoirs of a
Janissary (Ann Arbor: Published under the
auspices of the Joint Committee on Eastern
Europe, American Council of Learned Societies,
by the Dept. of Slavic Languages and
Literatures, University of Michigan, 1975), 29,
188. Early in his account the author praises the
“great justice” of the heathens, and later on
relates how Christian peasants ordered to provide
logistical support for the army by following it
and selling food were always given fair prices.
The translator has doubts on whether Mihailovic
personally witnessed some of the material in said
chapters, but the latter example is one he may
well have. If the details cannot be asserted as
authentic, the general impression of a Christian
who ends his memoirs with an exhortation for a
war to liberate Christians is a very favorable one
as far as Ottoman fairness to minorities goes.
44

some Christians in recently conquered
areas.
Information on Christian tax
receipts also shows an interesting pattern
in terms of Ottoman relaxation of
restrictions on Christians. Lowry’s
analysis of receipts in the Balkan district
of Radifolo (97.5 % Orthodox) shows
that the average tax rate per Christian
household increased 31.8% between
1465 and 1478.46 Lowry notes that in
1465 Muslim households, and those of
new converts to Islam, were exempt
from a major tax (the resm-i cift).
However, he finds that in 1478 the few
Muslim families that converted and the
immigrant Muslim households found
their exemptions removed and were
forced to pay the tax, approximating
their burden to that of Christian
families.47 This suggests that an active
economic promotion of Islam was halted
due to the need for revenue to fund the
continuing Ottoman campaigns. The
burden of the devshirme also appears to
have been borne by prisoners of war
rather than subject Christians during this
expansion48 Overall, the problems and
pressures of conquest likely resulted in a
46

Lowry, 167. Lowry examines tahrin defters,
which are taxes due to local landlords. These
have inherent limitations in not mentioning taxes
paid to the sultan; however, they are appropriate
for a primarily agricultural focus and for
intertemporal comparisons. The figures I use
here are his conversions of the tax rate in
Ottoman currency (which was devalued) into the
more stable florin – thus, the effective increase in
taxes on the buying power of Ottoman subjects.
47
Lowry, 173-174.
48
Mihailovic, 157, mentions that the devshirme
system used captured prisoners of war first and
avoided taking subject boys if the former haul
was big enough – while again the evidence that
he saw such practices first hand is not
compelling, the fast pace of Ottoman conquest
would logically reduce the pressure of devshirme
on subject Balkan Christians.

relatively pressure free experience for
Christians and the church.
The turn to consolidation by
successive Ottoman sultans witnessed a
reversal of some of these trends.
Trabzon revisited shows that by the 1486
receipt the local Christian auxiliaries had
been transferred to Albania in return for
Janissaries and some other Christian
timar holders, but by 1515 all the timar
holders are Muslims and fully half are
Janissaries, and a typical Ottoman
pattern of administration emerges.49
Mihailovic’s claim that the sultan
garrisons all his fortresses with
Janissaries or government forces is thus
belatedly satisfied.50 The fate of
incorporated Christian auxiliary cavalry
and of timar holders in Trebizond is
repeated throughout the newly
conquered Balkan regions – strong in
numbers after the conquest, Christian
military forces have largely disappeared
by 1515 as the Ottoman government
finds itself able to absorb its conquests.51
The consolidation of Ottoman authority,
evident here to the disadvantage of
empowered Christians, resulted in
changes elsewhere as well.
The pressure on Christians in the
capital was reflective of a continuing one
on Christianity in the cities. Ottoman
Muslim influence was highly focused in
urban areas. Out of a Balkan population
80% Christian and only 19 % Muslim by
around 1520, 85% of total Muslim
homes were concentrated in 10 out of 28
Balkan districts.52 Furthermore, nine of
the twelve most important urban centers
in the Balkans had substantially more
Muslims than Christians already by the
year 1478, a point which graphically
49

Lowry, 140-143.
Mihailovic, 151, for his comment.
51
Lowry, 146.
52
Vryonis, 130-131.
50

documents that cities were the focal
centers of Islamic power.53 Case studies
in Saloniki and Trabzon confirm that the
Muslim population in each was
overwhelmingly forced migrants54.
Focused government efforts to move
Muslims to Trabzon continued at least
well into the first half of the sixteenth
century.55 These findings show a focused
and ongoing effort by the Ottoman
government to maintain a particular
balance in important cities, one featuring
minority religions but as importantly
maintaining a Muslim majority.56 The
impact of this focus manifested itself in
very different experiences Orthodoxy in
rural areas as compared to the cities.
The conversion of churches into
mosques gives an excellent indication of
the different experiences in rural and city
Christian life. Even during the relatively
cosmopolitan rule of Mehmed II,
53

Vryonis, 132. The three Christian exceptions
were Athens (99.5 % Christian), Nicopolos (62.3
%), and Trikala (41.5 versus 36.3 Muslim). The
city of Saloniki was had a small Muslim margin
over Christians (25.2 to 20.5), but was unique in
having a majority Jewish population. Mansell,
48, notes that the population of Constantinople
retained a steady 58/42 Muslim/Christian ratio
for much of Ottoman history, a feature he
ascribes to deliberate government policy.
54
Lowry, 52-54. These two cities are important
as former major Byzantine centers, along with
the capital.
55
Lowry, 55. Lowry identifies discrete stages in
the Muslim repopulation of Trabzon in particular
(having surrendered, it was a viable, intact, but
Greek city after its subjugation). First, free land
grants were offered to encourage voluntary
settlement – this attracted some Muslims, but not
gentry or skilled labor. Secondly, specific
individuals were deported for leadership reasons
and to maintain a social balance. Third, groups
of craftsmen were deported.
56
The importance of this balance can be seen in
particular attention paid to importing Christians
to essentially empty Constantinople, and
Muslims to perfectly healthy but
overwhelmingly Greek Trabzon.

numerous Christian churches in
Constantinople were converted into
mosques.57 The story of church
takeovers was similar for most any town
the Turks settled, excepting only purely
Christian districts.58 However, churches
and monasteries in rural areas were left
largely untouched. Monasteries were
generally allowed to maintain (with tax
exemptions) holdings in physical
proximity to the monastery, while
absentee holdings were stripped or
heavily taxed.59 In one case, 13 of 15
property confiscations in the Trabzon
and adjoining Macuka valley district
were from the city itself, while the two
most important monasteries in the valley
lost no property.60 Even architectural
examinations of churches during this
period find that large churches matching
the scale of medieval Byzantine
churches were “inevitably” built away
from urban areas, while the more
advanced dome structure was found only
in rural areas.61 All these findings
57

Arnakis, 245. Arnakis notes 12 churches
converted during the lifetime of Patriarch
Gennadius, who is thought to have died in 1473.
58
Runciman, 192.
59
Lowry, 250. Lowry examines monasteries in
Mt. Athos and the Matzuoka region near
Trabzon. Absentee holdings could be in cities or
countryside, but monasteries were located
predominantly in the latter. Lowry, 241-2,
further reports that Mt. Athos itself, with its rural
concentration of 20 monasteries, enjoyed a very
favorably low tax rate while its varied holdings
were taxed much more greatly.
60
Beldiceau, as referenced in Lowry, Studies in
Defterology: Ottoman Society in the Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Centuries, 154-7. Beldiceau
generalizes that urban monasteries in this
comparison lost all their properties, while major
rural ones did not.
61
Curcic, “The Byzantine Legacy in
Architecture in the Ottoman Balkans”, in Lowell
Clucas, The Byzantine legacy in Eastern Europe
(Boulder; New York: East European
Monographs; Distributed by Columbia
University Press, 1988), 61, 67-68. Curcic, 61,

suggest an Ottoman move against not
religious buildings in general, but
specifically ones located in urban areas
or with particular wealth. These
conversions are a telling sign of the
much more trying Christian religious
experience in Ottoman cities.
The significance of these
policies towards Christian religious
institutions is great. Mosques served as
icons of Imperial legitimacy, and
converting opulent churches into Muslim
building proclaimed the power and
prestige of the dynasty.62 Moreover,
these actions reinforced the subjugation
of Christianity to Islam, a focus well
reflected by the Ottoman mania for
church bells.63 The erasure of competing
religious sounds asserted the subjugation
of other religions to Islam and the
superiority of Islam over them, as did the
practice of confiscating high profile
monastery wealth. While Christian
religious buildings were allowed to
remain for the most part, Ottoman
efforts ensured they would not be
notes that the vast majority of churches were
allowed to continue in their original function, but
that then again the vast majority of these were of
relatively modest scale. Curcic, 67-8, also
suggests that Turkish regulations played a role in
church construction, noting the proliferation of
domes after the new Balkan nations declared
independent. His evidence suggests opulent
urban churches were most likely to be converted;
plain, rural churches least likely.
62
Howard Crane, “The Ottoman Sultan’s
Mosques: Icons of Imperial Legitimacy”, in
Irene A. Bierman, Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, and
Donald Preziosi, The Ottoman City and its Parts
: Urban Structure and Social Order (New
Rochelle, N.Y.: A.D. Caratzas, 1991), 173-243,
offers a look at the importance of mosques to the
Ottoman dynasty.
63
Curcic, 68-69. Curcic classifies Turkish
reaction against bells as supremely harsh and
rigorously enforced. He says the only surviving
belfries did so because they were converted into
mosques.

competitors to of Islamic ones in terms
of grandeur or opulence, but clearly
secondary.
The status of Ottoman
Christians changed over time, and would
continue to change during the
forthcoming Islamic religious revival,
but there remains discernable a broad
view of Christian status in the actions of
Ottoman authorities in this period.64
Particular treatment of Christians varied
according to changing situations in the
Ottoman state.65 However, the overall
view of the Orthodox Christian
relationship vis-à-vis victorious Islam
remained constant. Christians were
offered a social contract, but one that
permanently marked them as secondclass citizens. The Ottoman relationship
with Christians delineated particular
limits for them in experiencing their
faith and limits to their rights as citizens.
While acceptance of an inoffensive and
less visible Christianity brought a place
in Islamic society, and the particular
details of that place changed over time,
Ottoman attitudes ensured Orthodox
Christians’ place in their empire
remained secondary.
Author’s Note
Turkish occupied names and
regions are used, except where a source
cites the Byzantine or Latin name.
Anatolia comprises modern day Turkey.
Trabzon is Trebizond, a city in NorthEastern Anatolia. Saloniki is
Thessaloniki, a city in the Thrace region
64

See Kunt, 63, for more on the Islamic religious
revival.
65

Braude, 438. Braude points out that Ottoman
archival sources show an unsurprising trend: A
need to reinforce restrictions on Christians was
apparently felt in times of public distress and
wartime.

of modern day Greece. Constantinople is
referred to by the Ottomans and by
Turks today as Istanbul – I’ve retained
the Byzantine name because my focus
lies during its transition from Byzantine
to Turkish capital. I also refer to the
author of “Memoirs of a Janissary” in a
Latin form (as Mihailov) for simplicity’s
sake. Any references to “Christians” are
meant to indicate specifically Orthodox
Christians – Armenians had their own
patriarchate, and are outside the scope of
this paper. The Near East refers to the
modern day Middle East, Iraq, and Iran.
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